Understanding State Preferences With Text As Data: Introducing the UN
  General Debate Corpus by Baturo, Alexander et al.
Understanding State Preferences With Text As Data:
Introducing the UN General Debate Corpus ∗
Alexander Baturo
Dublin City University
alex.baturo@dcu.ie
Niheer Dasandi
University of Birmingham
n.dasandi@bham.ac.uk
Slava J. Mikhaylov
University of Essex
s.mikhaylov@essex.ac.uk
1 July 2017
Abstract
Every year at the United Nations, member states deliver statements during the
General Debate discussing major issues in world politics. These speeches pro-
vide invaluable information on governments’ perspectives and preferences on a
wide range of issues, but have largely been overlooked in the study of international
politics. This paper introduces a new dataset consisting of over 7,300 country
statements from 1970–2014. We demonstrate how the UN General Debate Corpus
(UNGDC) can be used to derive country positions on different policy dimensions
using text analytic methods. The paper provides applications of these estimates,
demonstrating the contribution the UNGDC can make to the study of international
politics.
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Introduction
Every September, the heads of state and other high-level country representatives gather in New
York at the start of a new session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and address
the Assembly in the General Debate. The General Debate (GD) provides the governments
of the almost two hundred UN member states with an opportunity to present their views on
international conflict and cooperation, terrorism, development, climate change, and other key
issues in international politics. As such, the statements made during GD are an invaluable
and, largely untapped, source of information on governments’ policy preferences across a wide
range of issues over time.
Government preferences are central to the study of international relations and comparative
politics. As preferences cannot be directly observed, they must be inferred from states’ ob-
served behavior. One approach has been to use military alliances as an indicator of preference
similarity (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 1983). This approach, however, provides little information
about preferences when states do not have alliances. Scholars have instead overwhelmingly re-
lied on UNGA voting records to estimate foreign policy preferences (see Voeten, 2013; Bailey,
Strezhnev and Voeten, 2015). However, UNGA voting-based methods – like all measures of
preference – rely on certain assumptions, and as such, have both strengths and limitations (see
Voeten, 2013). For example, one shortcoming is estimates of state preference are derived from
the limited number of issues that are voted on in the UNGA in a given year.1 Therefore, it is
essential that researchers can draw on additional data and measures to avoid producing findings
about government preferences that are based on one type of observed state behavior.
We argue that the application of text analytic methods to General Debate statements can
provide much-needed additional measures and tools that can broaden our understanding of
government preferences and their effects. The use of text analytic methods is rapidly gain-
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ing ground in comparative politics and legislative studies (see Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003;
Proksch and Slapin, 2010; Herzog and Benoit, 2015). To date, however, there has been little
effort to use speeches to estimate policy preferences in international relations. The formal and
institutionalized setting of the GD; its inclusion of all UN member states – which are provided
with equal opportunity to address the Assembly; and the fact that it takes place every year,
makes the GD ideal for using text analysis to derive estimations of state preferences that can be
applied to systematic analyses of international politics.
This paper introduces a new dataset, the UN General Debate Corpus (UNGDC), consisting
of 7,314 General Debate statements from 1970-2014, that we have pre-processed, categorised
and prepared for empirical applications. In the next section, we discuss the characteristics,
content, and purpose of the UN General Debate. Secondly, we explain the process of collecting
and preprocessing the statements, and provide an overview of the UNGDC. We then use the
text as data approach we show how the UNGDC can be used to derive estimates of government
preferences, providing applications of these estimates. We conclude by outlining potential uses
of the UNGDC in future research.
The UN General Debate and world politics
The General Debate marks the start of the UNGA regular session each year. By tradition, since
1947, the opening speech is made by Brazil, with the US also scheduled to speak on the first day.
Typically, the heads of state and governments speak during the first days of the GD, followed by
vice-presidents, deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers, and concluding with the heads
of delegation to the UN (Nicholas, 1959; Bailey, 1960; Luard and Heater, 1994; Smith, 2006).
While numbers vary across sessions, on average heads of state or government comprise 39% of
speakers; vice-presidents, deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers make up around 54%
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of speakers; with country representatives to the UN constituting 7% of all speakers.
The GD provides governments with an opportunity to declare, and to have on public record,
their official position on various major international events of the past year (Smith, 2006). In
addition, country representatives use the GD venue to present their governments’ perspectives
on broader underlying issues in international politics. Their speeches frequently deal with
issues of mutual concern such as terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, development and aid,
and climate change – often appealing to the international community to do more to tackle these
issues. For example, in 1995 the US discussed UN reform, non-proliferation, terrorism, money
laundering and the narcotics trade in its GD statement. In turn, the UK and France both drew
attention to the challenges of UN peacekeeping, while India discussed terrorism, disarmament,
human rights, and concerns about the inability of global institutions, such as the WTO, to
address the needs of the Global South.
There are several important characteristics of GD speeches that have implications for the
use of these statements in deriving estimates of state preferences. In contrast to UNGA roll-
call votes, which are directly linked to the adoption of UN resolutions, GD speeches are not
institutionally connected to decision-making within the UN. As a consequence, states face
lower external constraints and pressures when delivering GD statements than when voting in
the UNGA. Indeed, studies that use UNGA voting highlight the various constraints countries
face when voting as a result of, among other things, aid relationships and strategic voting blocs
(see Kim and Russett, 1996; Voeten, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). The lack of external
constraints means that when delivering their GD statements, governments have more leverage
with the positions they take and the issues they emphasize. Hence, GD statements provide more
information on key national priorities than the limited number of votes in the UNGA.
This view is supported by interviews conducted by the authors with members of the diplo-
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matic community. The Deputy Representative of the Finnish Mission to the UN, for example,
explained, “speeches at the General Debate are interesting because they flesh out national poli-
cies – what states think... the General Debate is the one place where states can speak their mind;
it reflects the issues that states consider important.” Similarly, a spokesperson for the German
Mission to the UN stated that the absence of external pressures when delivering GD statements
means “these speeches are the most sovereign thing that a country does as a member of the
UN.”2 It is clear that non-democratic regimes also attach great importance to GD statements.
For example, members of Russia’s inner political circle not only viewed the 2015 GD statement
as a key summary of its foreign policy concerns, they were also apparently aware of its content
weeks in advance.3
A significant consequence of the relative lack of external constraints in the GD is that mem-
ber states can more freely express their government’s perspectives on issues deemed important
– including more contentious issues. As Smith (2006, 155) argues, a key function of the GD is
that “it provides members with the opportunity to blow off steam on contentious issues without
causing undue damage.” This is particularly relevant for smaller nations which can use the GD
to raise more disagreeable political issues (see Nicholas, 1959). For example, in 2014, Antigua
and Barbuda’s statement emphasized the failure of the US government to adhere to a ruling
from the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body that stated that the US should pay compensation to
Antigua and Barbuda. In making this complaint, the Antiguan representative highlighted the
importance of the GD for smaller nations, stating “my small nation has no military might, no
economic clout. All that we have is membership of the international system as our shield and
our voice in this body as our sword.”
The fewer external constraints on representatives when delivering GD statements does not,
however, imply that these speeches are not strategic. Scholars have long recognized that “mem-
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ber states present themselves exclusively in the guise in which they wish to be known” during
these annual debates (Nicholas, 1959, p. 98). In fact, a key purpose of the General Debate
is that it provides governments with the opportunity to “influence international perceptions of
their state, aiming to position their states favorably, as well as to influence the perception of
other states” (Hecht, 2016, p. 10). Therefore, governments use GD speeches strategically to
signal their preferences among the community of states. This use of strategic signaling in the
GD can be seen when we compare references to Iran in the US statements in 2012 and 2013.
In the 2012 address, President Obama was highly critical of Iran:
In Iran we see where the path of a violent and unaccountable ideology leads [...]
Time and again, it has failed to take the opportunity to demonstrate its nuclear
program is peaceful [...] Make no mistake: a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge
that can be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of
Gulf nations and the stability of the global economy [...] and that is why the United
States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
In contrast, speaking a year later, the US president was more reconciliatory, offering to give
diplomacy one last chance in relation to Iran’s nuclear program:
... if we can resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, that can serve as a major
step down a long road towards a different relationship, one based on mutual in-
terests and mutual respect [...] America prefers to resolve its concerns over Iran’s
nuclear program peacefully [...] We are not seeking regime change, and we respect
the right of the Iranian people to access peaceful nuclear energy [...]
A few hours later during the same session, President Rouhani in his address also empha-
sized diplomacy and the hope of reaching a compromise. The world has subsequently learned
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that in the background, the US and Iran held secret talks that eventually led to the breakthrough
and signing of the intermediate deal (Borger and Kamali, 2013). As such, the change in rhetoric
between 2012 and 2013 demonstrates the strategic nature of GD speeches. A further example
of both the importance placed by governments on the GD address and its strategic purpose is
provided by the Chilcot Inquiry into the UK’s role in the Iraq War. The report contains a memo
sent by Prime Minister Tony Blair to President George W. Bush, complimenting the US Presi-
dent on the speech delivered in the 2002 General Debate setting out the case for war, “It was a
brilliant speech ... it puts us on exactly the right strategy to get the job done.”4 Hence, the US
speech was seen as part of the US and UK strategy to build support for intervention in Iraq.
The lack of external constraints on member states in delivering GD statements means that
they can use their address to indicate the issues considered most important by devoting more
attention to these topics. As governments can choose what issues to discuss or ignore, and
how strongly to emphasize certain issues, the GD provides detailed information about a gov-
ernment’s position on a policy issue, and also the importance – or salience – of an issue for
a government. As Smith (2006, 155) notes, the General Debate acts “as a barometer of inter-
national opinion on important issues, even those not on the agenda for that particular session.”
The focus on position and salience means that GD speeches can be used to uncover the most
important topics that emerge in international politics over time.
UNGDC: The UN General Debate Corpus
The speeches made in the General Debate are subsequently deposited at the United Nations Dag
Hammarskjold Library. However, statements made before 1992 are stored as image copies of
typewritten documents. These are of very poor image quality and require additional preprocess-
ing using optical character recognition software. We collected speeches through the dedicated
webpages of the individual UNGA General Debates and the UN Bibliographic Information
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System (UNBIS).
Speeches are typically delivered in the native language. Based on the rules of the Assembly,
all statements are then translated by UN staff into the six official languages of the UN. If a
speech was delivered in a language other than English, we use the official English version
provided by the UN. Therefore, all of the speeches in the UN General Debate Corpus (UNGDC)
are in English.
The annual sessions are assigned numbers, starting with the 1st session in 1946 up to the
most recent 70th Session in 2015. We collected all GD speeches from 1970 (Session 25) to
2014 (Session 69). In total, there are 7,314 country statements delivered from 1970-2014. The
number of countries participating in the GD increased from 70 in 1970 to 193 in 2014 in line
with the increase in UN membership. Non-member states may also participate in the GD (e.g.,
the Holy See and Palestine). Several states that previously participated in the GD have ceased
to exist. Where possible we linked such states to their legal successor states (e.g., USSR and the
Russian Federation). If this was not possible we kept speeches in the data under the country’s
last known name (e.g. German Democratic Republic). Overall, the corpus contains the GD
contributions from 198 countries. On average, speeches contain 123 sentences and 945 unique
words.5
Table 1 provides an overview of the UNGDC. The table shows average frequency of types
(unique form of a word), tokens (individual words), and sentences for each individual speech in
text corpus. In terms of who delivered the statement, 1,909 (44.3%) were delivered by heads of
state or government (e.g. presidents, prime ministers, kings); 2,126 (49.3%) by vice-presidents,
deputy prime ministers, and foreign ministers; and 276 (6.4%) by country representative at the
UN.6
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Year UN Membership GD Statements Types (mean freq) Tokens (mean freq) Sentences (mean freq)
1970 127 70 1569 8230 257
1971 132 116 1336 5927 230
1972 132 125 1157 4895 180
1973 135 120 1291 5923 230
1974 138 129 1093 4248 191
1975 144 126 1041 4280 165
1976 147 134 951 3720 151
1977 149 140 965 3452 135
1978 151 141 1159 4169 163
1979 152 144 1220 4804 200
1980 154 149 1173 4663 183
1981 157 145 1159 4357 183
1982 157 147 1134 3986 151
1983 158 149 1078 3669 157
1984 159 150 1160 3951 172
1985 159 137 1142 3605 113
1986 159 149 895 2715 85
1987 159 152 922 3010 102
1988 159 154 985 3463 124
1989 159 153 1036 3365 117
1990 159 156 1076 3606 125
1991 166 162 1086 3519 127
1992 179 167 932 2962 103
1993 184 175 1062 3433 135
1994 185 178 1142 4040 140
1995 185 172 1255 4306 168
1996 185 181 1220 4149 157
1997 185 176 915 2659 122
1998 185 181 892 2749 115
1999 188 181 857 2567 91
2000 189 178 937 2677 88
2001 189 189 681 1925 78
2002 191 188 588 1465 58
2003 191 189 666 1761 72
2004 191 192 557 1400 61
2005 191 185 505 1311 51
2006 192 193 554 1393 63
2007 192 191 573 1392 52
2008 192 192 609 1498 59
2009 192 193 662 1754 65
2010 192 189 631 1668 58
2011 193 193 709 2097 79
2012 193 194 626 1671 66
2013 193 192 776 2306 71
2014 193 193 555 1451 50
Table 1: UN General Debate Corpus. Note: Descriptive statistics for the UNGDC containing
7,314 statements delivered by heads of state or their representative from 1970–2014. From
2011, President of the European Commission made a separate statement on behalf of the EU.
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Empirical application: Preferences on single issue dimensions
The UNGDC can be used by scholars who require easy access to the statements and may want
to read a particular text, or compare selected statements. Primarily, however, we envision the
UNGDC to be used in quantitative applications looking at the nature, formation, and effects
of state preferences in world politics. Treating text as data has a long tradition in political
science (for a review, see Laver, 2014). Since the earlier introduction of text scaling methods
to estimate policy positions on dimensions of interest – such as Wordscore (Laver, Benoit and
Garry, 2003) and Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch, 2008) – the availability and complexity of
methods has increased dramatically (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013; Herzog and Benoit, 2015).
The majority of such methods are either directly derived from, or can be traced to, the natural
language processing literature in computer science and computational linguistics (e.g. Lowe,
2008; Benoit et al., N.d.). Wordscore is by far the most popular text scaling method in political
science based on a Google Scholar citation count. It is related to the Naive Bayes classifier
deployed for text categorization problems (Benoit et al., N.d.).
Working with text as data generally involves using the bag-of-words approach, whereby
each document can be represented by a multiset (bag) of its words that disregards grammar and
word order. Word frequencies in the document are then used to classify the document into one
of two categories. In Wordscore the learning is supervised by providing training documents that
are a priori known to belong to either category, so that the chosen dimension is substantively
defined by the choice of training documents.
As an illustration of this approach, we derive estimates of preferences on the very specific
issue of USA-Russia rivalry in world politics. Figure 1 maps wordscore estimates for the 2014
UN General Debate. We use statements by the US and Russia as reference texts. We therefore
a priori define the policy dimension as Russia vs USA. We do not use the resulting scores as
10
USA vs Russia: Wordscore 2014
−7.64 13
Figure 1: Wordscore Map 2014. Note: The scores are estimated in quanteda package (version
0.9.9-3) in R (Benoit et al., N.d.). We follow standard preprocessing during the tokenization
stage, remove English stopwords, and perform stemming. We also trim the document-feature
matrix to have features that appear at least five times in three documents. USA is given ref-
erence score (+1) and Russia (−1). Results are rescaled using classical LBG rescale, hence
predicted scores may be beyond the (−1;+1) range.
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an explanatory variable in an empirical application here due to limited space. However, such
an application would clearly be of value for IR research. Here, we simply demonstrate how it
is possible to derive estimates of differences between UN member states, using the text as data
approach.
Empirical application: Preferences on multiple dimensions
While estimating state preferences on single issue dimensions has many benefits, countries
routinely express preferences on multiple dimensions of foreign policy. We therefore turn to
correspondence analysis (CA) — a dimensionality reduction technique (e.g. Bonica, 2013). In
CA, the first dimension is fitted to explain maximal variation in the data, while subsequent di-
mensions explain maximal residual variation (which means dimensions are orthogonal to each
other). Unlike Wordscore, the definition of the dimensions produced by CA must be discerned
inductively, a posteriori (Laver, 2014). This also implies that the dimensions produced by CA
may correspond to single, multiple, or meta issues.
Lowe (2016) suggests that position estimated by such models is a low dimensional summary
of the relative emphasis of one topic over another, compared to what would be expected by
chance. This is consistent with a key assumption of the saliency theory of party competition
(Budge et al., 2001), which posits that the policy differences between parties are determined by
their contrasting emphases on different issues. In the context of GD statements, the CA model
fitted to the count data of unique words captures countries’ relative emphasis of different issues
— and therefore the differences in their policy preferences.
A benefit of using CA is that it allows us to easily estimate positions on multiple dimen-
sions. We demonstrate the ease of using multidimensional text scaling by including the new
CA measures in an existing analysis of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and US nonsur-
12
render agreements (Kelley, 2007). The format of this article prevents us from covering issues
in detail; therefore the following is intended merely as an illustrative example. In brief, the
US sought to pressure other states to sign bilateral agreements not to surrender US citizens
to the ICC. This attempt to seek exceptional treatment was widely criticized for inconsistency
with international norms, and many countries (but not all) turned it down. Kelley (2007, p.
573) argues that for these states normative preferences trumped strategic concerns. Overall, the
views on the nonsurrender agreements were complex and unlikely to be reduced to an easily
identifiable single-issue dimension.
13
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Ye
ar
CA Dimension 2
Co
un
try
l
RU
S
US
A
US
A 
an
d 
Ru
ss
ia
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−
0.
50
−
0.
25
0.
00
0.
25
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Ye
ar
CA Dimension 2
Co
un
try
l
G
BR
US
A
US
A 
an
d 
UK
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−
0.
50
−
0.
25
0.
00
0.
25
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Ye
ar
CA Dimension 1
Co
un
try
l
RU
S
US
A
US
A 
an
d 
Ru
ss
ia
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Ye
ar
CA Dimension 1
Co
un
try
l
G
BR
US
A
US
A 
an
d 
UK
Fi
gu
re
2:
C
A
1
an
d
C
A
2
of
A
lli
es
an
d
O
pp
on
en
ts
.
N
ot
e:
T
he
fo
ur
su
bp
lo
ts
sh
ow
co
rr
es
po
nd
en
ce
an
al
ys
is
es
tim
at
es
fo
r
U
SA
,R
us
si
a
an
d
th
e
U
K
on
th
e
fir
st
an
d
se
co
nd
di
m
en
si
on
s,
as
di
sc
us
se
d
in
te
xt
.O
ve
rl
ai
d
lin
es
ar
e
lo
es
s
sm
oo
th
er
s.
14
To determine the optimal number of dimensional estimates to include in the estimation
we rely on the leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV) method (James et al., 2013, p. 178).
Given the sample size, we considered alternative specifications with up to ten CA dimensions,
as presented in Figure 3.7 For each alternative model we calculate the cross-validation error. As
the LOOCV indicates that three CA dimensions is optimal, we include three dimensions to the
original specification that predicts whether countries signed nonsurrender agreements (Kelley,
2007).
The results presented in the second subplot in Figure 3 indicate that the CA3 coefficient is
statistically significant. What does this mean substantively? A detailed discussion is limited
by the scope of the paper, but we can gain some insight from Figure 4, which shows the most
important words defining the variation on that dimension. The results suggest that states that
expressed stronger concerns about security and terrorism were more likely to sign the nonsur-
render agreement. We interpret this as indicating security concerns alongside normative goals
influenced decisions on whether to sign the nonsurrender agreement with the US. It is, however,
important to note that further analysis would be required to fully support this claim.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a new dataset, the UNGDC, for understanding and measuring state pref-
erences in world politics. We have demonstrated how scholars can extract relevant information
from the UNGDC using text analytic methods. Specifically, we have shown how the UNGDC
can be used to uncover single and multiple dimensions of government preferences, and have
provided examples of how such estimates can be applied.
Estimates derived from the UNGDC complement existing measures of government prefer-
ences based on UNGA voting. In fact, a possible application of the UNGDC would be to inves-
tigate the relationship between preferences expressed by governments in their GD statements
15
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and their voting behavior in the UNGA across difference issue areas. This would shed light on
whether governments express their foreign policy preferences in different ways depending on
the particular audience they face and the associated costs.
A benefit of using texts to derive information about preferences is that they provide detailed
information about countries’ views on a particular policy area, and so can be compared to other
text data. Hence, a future application of the UNGDC would be to compare the statements
with international treaties and laws. Such comparisons can show whether some countries have
greater influence on specific international agreements, and how countries perceive such agree-
ments. For example, researchers may consider the extent to which states adopt language based
on international law in their GD statements. Finally, in addition to examining the effects of
government preferences, the UNGDC can also help us better understand how state preferences
are formed, and which groups in a country influence preferences across different issues.
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Notes
1As Ha¨ge and Hug (2016) explain, the UNGA has always practiced the adoption of many
items on its agenda without a formal vote.
2These quotes are from interviews conducted by Niheer Dasandi and Nicola Chelotti with
Jaane Taalas (9 June 2015) and Christian Doktor (16 June 2015).
3Foreign Minister Lavrov revealed the issues Russia planned to discuss during the 2015 Gen-
eral Debate two weeks before the debate. See http://www.interfax.ru/russia/466392,
accessed 27 August 2016.
4Section 3.4 of the Iraq Inquiry, p.187, see http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/
248175/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry_section-34.pdf, accessed 25 January 2017.
5We make the UNGDC publicly available on the Harvard Dataverse at http://dx.doi.
org/10.7910/DVN/0TJX8Y. We have also developed a browsing tool that allows users to ex-
plore individual documents and the topics covered, including the top words that characterize
topics, the evolution of topics over time, word distributions across topics, the underlying digi-
tized texts of speeches, and the source PDFs at http://ungd.smikhaylov.net. The website
also enables users to download the UN General Debate Corpus.
6Detailed information is available for sessions 49–69, transcripts from earlier sessions do not
provide the same degree of detail regarding the post of the speaker. In the rare cases where the
post of the speaker was missing in the transcript for sessions 49–69, we added this information.
7We implement the simplest specification search using additive models. Users can imple-
ment more extensive searches using a similar approach, e.g., including interaction terms.
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